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Richard T Harrison2 (University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK) 
 
Short title: Equity crowdfunding 
Main message 
Equity crowdfunding as a rapidly growing source of finance for new and growing 
entrepreneurial ventures poses new challenges for financial regulators and potentially disrupts 
the early stage risk capital market and its existing actors, notably business angels. 
Key points 
Equity crowdfunding responds primarily to the needs of small start-ups that do not manage to 
access bank finance, or who do not need the larger sums available from venture capital or 
business angels.   
It is not appropriate for firms where business information is too sensitive to be shared with a 
large number of potential investors, nor those which require substantial amounts of follow on 
financing.   
Within these parameters and with sensible policy implementation and regulation, equity 
crowdfunding can play a useful complement to the role of business angels in innovation finance 
as an alternative form of start-up and growth capital. 
 
Introduction 
Equity crowdfunding is a method of funding where entrepreneurs seek financing from many 
individuals in exchange for shares in the firm. It differs from other forms of crowdfunding in that 
it involves the sale of a security (Harrison 2013), offering a financial return to funders 
(Belleflamme et al 2013), through an open call for funding on internet based platforms (Ahlers et 
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al 2015).  These platforms primarily target small investors and provide both the legal base and 
the ability to process the financial transactions (Decarre and Wetterhag, 2014). They receive 
applications from entrepreneurs who want to showcase their business idea and, typically after a 
background check, host the entrepreneur’s pitch to potential investors. If the funding goal is 
reached (in the “all or nothing” model), the funds are distributed to the project owner, otherwise 
they are returned to investors.  As business models in the sector continue to evolve, some 
international platforms offer a profit sharing type of crowdfunding, with a VC type structure: 
investors pool fees in a community investment fund run by the platform which invests in 
particular entrepreneurial projects. These are held for a few years after which the platform takes 
a 20-25 per cent share of the profits and distributes the remainder. 
Like other forms of crowdfunding, this model has a number of potential benefits for start-ups.  It 
enables them to test and build a market and gives them access to a large pool of investors.  
Unfortunately, it also has potential costs: reputation effects if campaign goals are not met; IP 
exposure; investor exhaustion; and the time required to “work the crowd”.  The up-front costs are 
not small either.  Over and above the required accountant fees, UK platforms in 2013 charged 
between 5 per cent and 12 per cent, often with a further 3 per cent-5 per cent processing fee 
(compared with typical angel group charges of 5 per cent of cash raised plus a 1 per cent 
warrant3). These costs suggest that crowdfunding may not be the answer for every entrepreneur.  
Crowdfunding also has implications for business angels.  Should it be viewed as useful 
complement to angel investing? Or a problematic new development that could jeopardize recent 
strides in seed investing?  It is therefore important to prevent an over enthusiastic response from 
unaware investors, and in due course, regulators.   
Literature Review 
There is a small (albeit growing) number of articles on equity crowdfunding, a result of the short 
time period of available data (Baeck et al, 2014; Collins and Pierrakis, 2012). Research from the 
UK is arguably the most developed, as it was one the first countries to give regulatory approval 
and has the fastest growing market (Wardrop et al. 2015; and Bruton et al. 2015).  
Most articles attempt to develop investor and firm profiles, particularly those considered 
“successful”.  Platforms catering to equity crowdfunding form only about 7.3 per cent of the total 
number of worldwide platforms (Cumming and Johan, 2013). The average amount of money 
collected per campaign is about $190,000 (Massolution, 2013) and the majority of firms seeking 
funding are between one and three years old. A further 28 per cent are established four to eight 
year old small firms and 15 per cent are start-ups with no revenue yet (Knowledge Peers, 2013). 
The average campaign lasts around eight weeks (De Buysere et al. 2012). Worldwide, it is 
estimated that US$1.1 billion was raised in equity crowdfunding in 2014 (compared with 
US$11.08 billion in peer-to-peer lending and $6.1 billion in other forms of crowdfunding) 
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(Massolution, 2015).  This remains small in comparison with angel investment of around $24bn 
in the US (Sohl 2013; CVR 2015) and between £750m and £1bn annually in the UK (Mason et al 
2015). However, equity crowdfunding has expanded rapidly, rising in the UK from £1.7m in 
2011 to £3.9m in 2012, £28m in 2013, £84m in 2014 and £245m in 2015, almost equaling total 
venture capital investment (excluding private equity) (Zhang et al 2015). The biggest challenge 
for the growth of equity crowdfunding has been that in many countries existing fund raising 
legislation, with its skew towards the protection of investors, has blocked or hindered 
development of this type of finance (Borg, 2007). This situation is changing, however, as 
countries change or consider changing their securities legislation to be more equity 
crowdfunding “friendly” (CAMAC, 2014). 
Crowdfunding attracts a few investors who act like business angels, defined as “a private 
individual, mostly high net worth, usually with business experience, who directly invests part of 
his or her personal assets in new and growing unquoted businesses.” (EBAN, 2014). As such 
they are normally imbued with a real knowledge of a project’s market and product.  Most, 
however, are more interested in projects that share their own values, or are locally engaging (De 
Buysere et al, 2012). According to Zhang et al (2014), UK equity crowdfunding investors differ 
considerably from business angels: they are younger (average age 40), smaller scale (average 
portfolio size below £5500, with one third having invested under £1000), and unsophisticated 
(only 38 per cent were classified as professional or high net worth investors, and 44 per cent of 
investors were using money from their savings rather than investment budgets). This is 
consistent with a recent small-scale study of the demand for equity crowdfunding in Scotland, 
where six companies raised £619,000 in total from 649 backers [average £950 per investor] for 
an average equity stake of 17.5 per cent per company [or 0.13 per cent per investor]. Given their 
lack of specific knowledge, these investors attempt to mitigate risk by using the actions of other 
crowdfunders as a source of information in their funding decision (Ward and Ramachandran, 
2010). In fact, Pierrakis and Collins (2013) show that crowdfunders only spend an average of 15 
minutes on due diligence before investing, as opposed to 20 hours for business angels. As the 
LINC (2014) report notes, this suggests a concerning lack of due diligence, something which is 
often compounded when firms / governments offer ‘sweeteners’ to invest, in the form of tax 
breaks or discounts on products/ services.  Given that many equity crowdfunding investors are 
not experienced investors they require and seek less information upfront and do little if any 
contract negotiation (Macht and Weatherston, 2014).  As small shareholders they have little 
power over management and may be issued shares with no voting rights (Brown et al 2015).  
Furthermore, the percentage of equity offered during the crowdfunding process is much lower 
than that offered to angel investors (Financial Times, 2015), leading to concerns over valuation 
and likely returns in such deals (de Vasconcelos 2015). Belleflamme and Schwienbacher (2013) 
also show that product drives attract larger amounts of capital than those that offer a service, 
suggesting that the tangibility of products may be more appealing to inexperienced investors. IT 
entrepreneurs in particular preferred angels who “better understand” complex IT business plans 
(Ingram and Teigland, 2013).  Not unexpectedly firms that disclose financing plans, and have 
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sound boards of directors (with professional curriculum vitae), are more likely to raise more 
money and do it quickly (Ahlers et al, 2012, Cumming and Johan, 2013).  
With respect to outcomes, Decarre and Wetterhag (2014) found that profit growth is positively 
influenced by offering a larger equity share; the presence of business angels; and early founder 
investment.  Interestingly, the authors found that when business angels were participants, profit 
growth was an average of 811 per cent higher than if no professional investors had taken part.  
Of course angels’ effectiveness is diluted in a crowdfunded investment, as these lack the 
alignment of interest and expectation characteristic of angel investments (LINC, 2014).  In 
Ingram and Teigland’s (2013) Swedish study, only 17 per cent of equity investors were repeat 
investors, suggesting that equity crowdfunding is not becoming the investment mechanism 
choice for many Swedes.  (A similar figure was found in a Scottish study, which estimated that 
about 76 per cent of crowdcube investors were one-time investors (LINC 2014).) Recent UK 
evidence suggests that while the remits of angel networks and equity crowdfunding platforms 
remain distinct, there is evidence of angel investors choosing to invest through crowdfunding 
platforms (British Business Bank, 2014).  For example, the Syndicate Room platform has an 
angel investor as an anchor contribution for a crowdfunding campaign.  In fact, some 45 per cent 
of angels in a recent UK study had invested alongside an equity crowdfunding platform (ERC, 
2014).  However, other research suggests this figure over-estimates the overlap, suggesting on 
the basis of a wider sample that 22 per cent of angels have invested through a crowdfunding 
platform (Mason and Botelho 2014). What is not known is the extent to which their profiles 
differ from other angels.  Are they smaller ticket investors at the lower end of the spectrum of 
angel investors, or more passive investors? 
Entrepreneurs also expressed concern about having a large number of individuals with equity in 
their companies and the difficulty of coming to consensus on big decisions, or even just 
“tracking down and convincing lots of individuals to sell if they tried to sell the company later” 
(Ingram and Teigland, 2013).  This is one of the key fears of equity crowdfunding: that “true 
potential high-growth companies may find themselves cut off from necessary follow-on funding 
as a result of having taken relatively small initial sums of early-stage funding from large 
numbers of inexperienced investors” (LINC, 2014: 36). This inability to sell or raise further 
capital is highlighted in the Decarre and Wetterhag (2014) study.  Of the 46 firms that they 
interviewed: 25 per cent received follow on capital from business angels;  7 per cent from VCs; 
13 per cent from another crowdfunding round;  13 per cent from a bank loan; 22 per cent from 
owner equity; and 24 per cent were not able to raise more funds.  (Slightly smaller amounts were 
achieved from those firms who stated that they had crowdfunded due to lack of other options.) 
This suggest that an initial crowdfunding success is not an “automatic” stamp of approval in 
terms of future “fundability”.  
A recent paper suggests an even more worrying situation in Germany. Of the 86 issues analyzed, 
only four received follow on financing and 22 underwent some form of insolvency proceeding 
(Khlon, Hornuf and Schilling, 2015). Together with the public failure of the clean energy 
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developer Prokon, this may have been the impetus for German authorities to limit individual 
investments to €1,000 in crowdfunded projects (with amounts above this permitted if investors 
have liquid assets of at least €100,000).  In the UK, there have also been calls for greater investor 
protection after the 2015 failures of Hokkei and Upper Street, which raised UK£320k and 
UK£243k respectively on Seedrs, and the 2016 collapse of Rebus, which raised over UK£810k 
from over 100 investors on Crowdcube. This latter case implies an average investment of just 
over £8000 per investor, somewhat at odds with the wider evidence that crowdfunders invest 
smaller amounts, and reflecting the highly skewed nature of equity crowdfunding (where 
campaigns are typically anchored on one or two large investors and backfilled by the crowd).  
Suggested investor protection measures include insurance levies and the adoption of a pooled 
approach as in peer-to-peer funding to mitigate risk (Palin, 2016). Failure, and the implications 
for regulation and investor protection, is not unusual.  Although the UK Crowdcube platform 
reports that only 6 per cent of over 300 companies raising money through their platform have 
subsequently failed, other research suggests that one in five companies that raised money on UK 
equity crowdfunding platforms between 2011 and 2013 in the UK have gone bankrupt (AltFi 
Data, 2015; Palin, 2016). This is consistent with other UK research that suggests that in 2012 and 
2013 the failure rate for crowdfunded companies (21.7 per cent in 2012, 25.4 per cent in 2013) 
was much higher than for those seed funded from other sources (8.6 per cent, 6.2 per cent). The 
gap appears much narrower for 2014 fundings however (4.5 per cent vs 3.6 per cent) (Gardiner 
2016).  These results suggest that in equity crowdfunded businesses failure emerges earlier than 
in other seed fund businesses, likely due to difficulties in raising follow-on investment. 
In summary therefore, crowdfunded investments have fewer knowledgeable investors, less due 
diligence, lower profit growth, less shareholder control, and less opportunity for follow-on 
financing than angel investing.  The presence of angel investors and investor protection measures 
can help reduce some of this discrepancy, however. The following section touches on policy 
attempts at such protection.  The article concludes with recommendations on how to address 
some of the policy gaps. 
Policy Comparison 
Countries differ quite substantially on how their crowdfunding policy addresses the balance 
between protecting investors and stimulating innovation.  In general, the legislative differences 
can be summarized by the answers to a number of questions.  Do they explicitly regulate 
crowdfunding? Do platforms, in US parlance, have to register as broker dealers and is there an 
exemption from payment services legislation with regard to handling funds (do they have to use 
a third party and/ comply with money laundering regulation)? Are there any capital requirements 
on platforms? Do firms have to publish a prospectus (with all company details, deadline, amount 
required, the capital structure, and the valuation)? Do firms have to provide audited financial 
statements? What risk declarations are required (relating to: minority ownership; corporate 
actions, possible dilution with additional issuances of shares or a sale of the issuer)? Must 
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platforms perform background checks on issuers? Must platforms enforce annual investor limits? 
Are projects only funded if the goal is met? Is there a “cooling off” period? What security 
measures are required to protect investor data? What restrictions on sales of shares exist? Finally, 
are issuers and funding portals able to advertise specific investment opportunities? 
 
In Europe, only six countries have explicit crowdfunding legislation, though a few more have 
drafts in progress. The European Prospectus Directive (2003/71/EC, amended by 2010/73/EC) 
allows freedom to national lawmakers to implement a country-specific promotion regime for 
sub-€5 million offerings, with most countries exempting these firms from having to offer a 
prospectus.  Also, with respect the European Act on Alternative Fund Managers (AIFMD), most 
countries interpret fund seekers as not falling under the definition of alternative investment funds 
(AIFs) and platforms as not falling under the definition of alternative investment fund managers 
(AIFMs). These designations impose a number of additional regulatory requirements on cross 
border investment fund activity.  Legal experts in these countries assume exemption because 
investment decisions are made by the investor itself and the platform provides a matching service 
only.  Pooling type platforms might be considered AIFMs, however, so the industry is calling for 
greater clarification from the EU authorities (ECN, 2014). 
The United Kingdom 
Under current UK legislation, platforms must be registered with Financial Conduct Authority 
(FCA). To avoid “financial promotion”, many engage an FCA-authorized firm to approve initial 
investor communications and only offer to accredited investors or existing shareholders. This 
may change though as there is heavy industry pressure for a “lighter touch” regarding 
promotions, especially those through social media (ECN, 2014). The FCA set out new rules for 
regulating equity (or investment-based) crowdfunding in March 2014 and reviewed their 
operation in 2015 (FCA. 2014; 2015). From October 2014, shares and debt securities (non-
readily realizable securities) can only be directly offered to retail consumers who take regulated 
advice, qualify as high net worth or sophisticated investors or confirm they will invest less than 
10 per cent of their net assets in this type of security (FCA, 2015).  Firms are also required to 
check whether consumers understand the risks if they do not take regulated advice. In their initial 
review the FCA identified problems (for the most part rectified following FCA intervention) 
with most of the UK’s equity crowdfunding websites. These include: first, a lack of balance, 
where many benefits are emphasized without a prominent indication of risk; second, insufficient, 
omitted or cherry-picking of information, leading to a potentially misleading or unrealistically 
optimistic impression of the investment; and third, the downplaying of important information, as 
in risk warnings being diminished by claims that no capital had been lost or the relevant risk 
warnings being less prominent than performance information (FCA, 2015). This is a matter of 
concern given that some 62 per cent of equity crowdfunding investors are retail investors with no 
previous investment experience of early stage or venture capital investment (Zhang et al 2014). 
The United States 
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Title II of the Jump Start Our Business (JOBS) Act allowed for public advertising of fundraising 
but restricted it to accredited investors.  Despite the restrictions, this ‘equity crowdfunding’ grew 
by $250 million since the Act was passed.  Title III of the JOBS Act came into force in October 
2015, legitimizing crowdfunding across the country.  It allows people with an annual income or 
net worth of less than $100,000 to invest 5 per cent of this (or $2,000 if that is greater).  Higher 
income earners can invest up to 10 per cent, but no individual is allowed to invest more than 
$100,000 per year. Depending on the size, offerings require either an outside accountant’s review 
or a full audit, and issuers have to provide investors with numerous details about their business.  
The campaign must be conducted through an SEC registered and Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority (FINRA) licensed intermediary, either a broker-dealer or a registered funding portal.  
These platforms must: ensure that investors are aware of risks, take measures to reduce fraud and 
protect investor privacy, enforce annual investor limits, be all or nothing models, permit 
cancellation of investment, and not advertise specific investment opportunities.  There will also 
be a one year restriction on share transfer unless it is to an accredited investor. (Seventeen states 
have also enacted separate intra-state Crowdfunding legislation that allows crowdfunding to state 
residents, some with higher spending caps than the federal bill.) 
 
 
Canada 
In Canada equity crowdfunding is legal under existing prospectus exemptions such as the 
accredited investor exemption (wealthy individuals that equate to roughly 4 per cent of the 
Canadian population), and the offering memorandum exemption.  The offering memorandum 
exemption allows firms to sell securities to the public after offering a memorandum to the 
purchaser (which included audited financial statements) and obtain a signed risk 
acknowledgement from the purchaser. (Some provinces have a $10000 limit on non-accredited 
investor  investment amounts). The accredited investor exemption has no limits, is subject to 
certain resale restrictions and requires the filing of documents offered to investors with the 
relevant Canadian securities regulatory authority and payment of an applicable fee.  Currently all 
portals need to register  (as ‘exempt market dealers’ ) which permits them to receive or hold 
investor funds in trust.   Registration requires that portals ensure that an investment is a suitable 
investment for a particular investor. Portals already operating in this manner include: SeedUps 
Canada, The Funding Portal and Optimize Capital Markets.  TSX Private Markets also recently 
launched its online platform seeking to do private placements and facilitate secondary market 
trading of securities of private and public issuers, to accredited investors (ECN, 2014).  Some 
provinces are considering licensing specific equity crowdfunding or “start-up” exemptions and 
Saskatchewan has already legalized the start-up exemption. Manitoba, New Brunswick, Nova 
Scotia, Ontario, Quebec and Saskatchewan are considering a proposed equity crowdfunding 
exemption (published for comment on March 2014). All except Ontario are also considering a 
proposed start- up exemption.  The equity crowdfunding exemption would require registration as 
‘restricted dealer’ with fewer regulatory requirements but would not allow portals to accept or 
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handle funds. Firms under these exemptions are required to post audited statements (for reporting 
firms) or statements reviewed by a CPA. There are holding periods on resale of shares and 
portals are not allowed to endorse or promote offerings. They must make investors complete an 
interactive questionnaire or obtain a signed risk acknowledgement form AND certification from 
investors that they comply with annual investment limits. Background checks need to be done in 
the proposed equity model. The start-up exemption also precludes holding funds but does not 
require registration.   
 
Sweden 
Sweden’s equity platform, FundedByMe has been around for a number of years. Its market is 
estimated at between €385 and €450 million per year, about the same size as the formal Swedish 
venture capital market. Platforms in Sweden are considered to be facilitating offerings of 
securities and as such must obtain a license from the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority 
(S-FSA) or co-operate with a licensed firm. Firms looking for less than €2,5m per year are not 
required to offer a prospectus.  A number of organizations offer added incentives.  For instance, 
the Internet Infrastructure Foundation .SE, tops up the amount a crowdfunding entrepreneur 
receives to 100 per cent if he/she manages to raise 50 per cent or more of the requested amount 
on the FundedByMe platform (Ingram and Teigland, 2013). 
 
Summary 
These country examples represent the early wave of the international growth of crowdfunding 
and demonstrate, as the International Organization of   Securities Commissions (IOSCO) has 
pointed out, that the national regulators in different jurisdictions have chosen different 
approaches to regulation (IOSCO, 2014). As the UK regulator makes clear, in developing a 
proportionate set of rules there is a balance to be struck between the permissive development in 
the market and the appropriate protection of consumers. The US experience, where the stalled 
and delayed implementation of the JOBS Act nationally created a void which some states (such 
as Texas) filled by enacting their own more lenient state-specific rules, has led to a fragmented 
approach between states, as a result of which platforms find it difficult to prepare a consistent 
marketing strategy to reach a mass audience. By contrast, and to a large measure building on the 
UK experience, there is interest in the development of EU-wide regulation designed to reduce or 
eliminate administrative barriers to cross-border activity, as in the European Securities and 
Markets Authority (ESMA) mapping of typical equity crowdfunding models onto existing EU 
legislation (ESMA, 2014).  
What runs through these regulatory efforts is an awareness of two sources of risk (ESMA 2015). 
The first are project risks. Many of the key risks in investment-based crowdfunding arise 
because the majority of projects invested in are smaller companies with a high failure rate and 
the securities are typically unlisted. This represents a significant potential of capital loss, risk of 
dilution through subsequent capital raising rounds, limited possibilities for liquidating an 
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investment and limited information available on which to base a decision.  The second are 
platform risks. These risks relate to the platforms’ business model, and include the potential for 
conflicts of interest, the impact of platform failure particularly where they hold or administer 
client assets and the risk that investors over-estimate the due diligence carried out. Against these 
risks, which are not trivial, are the supposed (but as yet untested or demonstrated) economic 
benefits: as ESMA 2015 expresses it, because crowdfunding has the potential to improve access 
to finance for the real economy and to widen the investment opportunities available to non-
institutional investors, there is also an opportunity cost if the development of the industry is 
unduly restricted. 
 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
Care must be taken to prevent platforms from triggering an overzealous regulatory response. 
This means extra attention must be taken to explain risks to unaccredited investors. For example, 
a recent study conducted by the UK Financial Conduct Authority noted that the material on some 
of the platforms was misleading, especially in terms of how shares would be treated in the event 
of a buyout. The platforms implied equal treatment when in fact they would be diluted in the 
event of a VC round. They also noted that many of the negative comments submitted by platform 
participants were taken down while positive ones were left up, creating a positive bias.  This 
issue will become more important as crowdfunding grows. 
It is also suggested that platforms adopt the “all-or-nothing” model as this can protect investors 
from over-optimistic bets if other more rational investors have not joined in. It also makes 
fundraisers choose more realistic goals, which can prevent over-valuation and accommodate 
future fund raising rounds (Tomczak and Brem, 2013; Bradford, 2012). However, given the 
‘momentum’ aspect of crowdfunding, it is important that the public sector does not co-invest 
through any type of vehicle on a crowd investment. Naïve investors might perceive this as a form 
of guarantee. The diminished role for passive public co-investment is another disadvantage of 
crowdfunding vis-a-vis angel investing. 
Over-valuation can be mitigated by reviewing the current practice where entrepreneurs value 
their campaign at the beginning. This is becoming increasingly problematic given the difficulty 
in measuring things like IP and market size. Suggested solutions include either allowing 
flexibility in the amount of equity offered over the course of the campaign, or instead allowing 
potential funders to bid on a set amount of equity (De Buysere, 2012).  Another encouraging 
practice already adopted by some platforms is the provision of training on how to value a 
business, using ex–investment bankers, fund managers and venture capitalists (Collins and 
Pierrakis, 2012). 
The crowdfunding platform Seedrs offers a potential solution to the problem of frustrated initial 
investors in the event of down round. They create a nominee structure where Seedrs acts as the 
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sole legal representative to ensure voting right changes are transparent (Palmer, 2015). 
Squareknot offers a similar service, while platforms such as ShareIn and Syndicate Room leave 
it to the company and investors to manage the post-investment processes (LINC, 2014). A 
widely accepted proxy advisor/ voting system would also help mitigate costs for funded 
companies.  It potentially makes it more difficult to obtain follow on capital though.  
A way to forestall potentially crippling regulation would be for platforms to work on 
standardizing risk measures. This would also help lessen the difficulties in ensuring adequate 
investor education. Standardization should also occur at a policy level. For instance, De Buysere 
et al. (2012) suggest that rules, preparation and approval procedure for sub -€5 million offerings 
be harmonized in the European Prospectus Directive to equalize compliance costs between 
countries. They also call for the European Commission to offer an exemption or light license to 
crowdfunding platforms with respect to reclaimable funds, as long as funds are separated from 
the platforms’ funds in case of bankruptcy.  
It is important that individual country legislation removes restrictions on the types of share 
allowed, especially in the anticipation of future dilution of the company's funders. Many start-
ups need to be able to issue preferred shares or convertible bonds if they are to attract follow on 
financing.  What would also help achieve this would be the scrapping of maximum investment 
limits for accredited investors (De Buysere et al. 2012).  A last concern relates to aggregate 
subscription limits. Although intended to protect the naive investor, they have the unwelcome 
result of reducing portfolio diversification and increasing risk (Khlon, Hornuf and Schilling, 
2015). 
Who then is crowdfunding for?  “These data appear to support the premise that [equity] 
crowdfunding may respond primarily to the needs of small start-ups that do not manage to access 
bank finance, or who do not need the larger sums available from venture capital or business 
angels” (LINC, 2014:12).  This could include a small lifestyle firm, or one with a tangible 
consumer product that needs the marketing/ consumer feedback aspect of crowdfunding  as a 
form of beta testing.  It is not appropriate for firms where business information is too sensitive to 
be shared with a large number of potential investors, nor those which require substantial amounts 
of follow on financing (OECD, 2015).  This represents a public policy and economic 
development challenge: “Development Agencies need to ensure that any engagement with 
crowdfunding is in support of their strategic economic development strategies, and that they are 
not diverted from these by inappropriate hype, popular mis-understanding of the realities of the 
economic impact of crowdfunding or the vested interests of platform operators.” (LINC, 2014: 
66). However, within these parameters and with sensible policy implementation, equity 
crowdfunding can play a useful complement to the role of business angels in innovation finance.   
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